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EXAMINER

WANG, BEN C

ART UNIT

PAPER NUMBER

2192

NOTIFICATION DATE

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*Continuation of 11 from the form PTO-303. does not place the application in condition for allowance because:*

Regarding the Applicant's arguments, dated August 17, 2009, on page 6 to page 8 of the "Remarks" pertaining to the rejections of the claims made under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), the Applicant asserts that *Jacobson* does not describe working sets and the term "working set" is explicitly and clearly defined in the written descriptions as follows (reproduced from Applicant's Remarks – page 7, third full paragraph – emphasis added):

As previously argued in the response under 37 CFR § 1.111, the term working set is explicitly and clearly defined in the written description as follows:

"In a program, a working set  $W(t_i, \tau)$  for  $i=1,2,\dots$ , is a set of distinct memory segments  $\{s_1, s_2, \dots, s_{n_i}\}$  accessed over the  $i^{\text{th}}$  window of size  $\tau$ . . ."<sup>5</sup>

Applicant's arguments are fully considered, but found to be not persuasive for at least the following reasons:

Firstly, Examiner respectfully traverses the argument of "working set" stated in the Remarks and notices that the term "working set" specifically pointed out by Applicant is an exemplary "working set" expression as set forth in "Managing Multi-configuration Hardware via Dynamic Working Set Analysis," in Proc. Of the 29<sup>th</sup> Annual Intl. Sym. On Computer Architecture, May 2002, pp. 233-244 (see page 3, lines 5-9 in Specification). Thus, the term, excerpted

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above, in the claim is NOT limited to the special term set forth in the specification as Applicant argued for.

Secondly, in additions, there are various kinds of “*working set*” expressions. For example, “*working set*” expressions can be associated with a specific type of memory access, or some combination. For example, a working set expression can correspond to program instructions fetched in which case it is referred to as an instruction working set. As another example, a working set expression can correspond to data accessed via load and store instructions, in which case it is referred to as a data working set. As another example, a working set expression can correspond to fetched branch instructions, in which case it is referred to as a branch working set (see page 3, lines 14-19 in the specification)

Thirdly, the Examiner would like to point out that the claims recite only “working set” without further definition. The claims are not particularly limited to the scope as argued by the Applicant. Thus, as the claims are interpreted as broadly as their terms reasonably allow (see MPEP §2111.01(I)), the interpretation of a broad limitation of “working set” expression as in light of the specification a working set can be expressed and associated with a specific type of memory access, or some combination. As another example, a working set expression can correspond to fetched branch instructions, in which case it is referred to as a branch working set expression (see lines 14-19, page 3 in the

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Specification) and the like by one of ordinary skill in the art is considered to be reasonable by its plain meaning.

Therefore, for at least the reasons set forth above, the rejections made under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) with respect to Claims 1-23 are proper and therefore, maintained.

/Ben C Wang/

Ben C. Wang

Examiner, Art Unit 2192

/Michael J. Yigdall/

Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2192